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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LELAND E. MATERN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RONALD D. PHILLIPS 
by his guardian ad litem, 
HEBER PHILLIPS, 
Defendant and Respondent 
Case 
No. 8935 
BRIEF OF AP·PELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident in question occurred on October 25, 
1957, at the hour of 7:50 a.m. near the intersection of 
Third East and Fifth South in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Appellant was driving his Ford pick-up truck south on 
Third East. He stopped his truck for a red light at 
Fifth South. 
Respondent was driving a model 1949 Plymouth 
sedan. Soon after he started driving he noticed that his 
brakes were low. (R. 135) He pulled into a service sta-
tion near the intersection of Third East and Fourth 
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South. He had the service station attendant put some 
brake fluid in. Without testing his brakes at all between 
the time the fluid was put in and the time of the accident, 
respondent drove out of the service station and proceeded 
south on Third East at a speed of twenty to thirty miles 
per hour. (R. 137 A and 140) When respondent got to a 
point approximately sixty feet behind appellant's truck, 
he applied the brakes but had no pressure at all. Re-
spondent's automobile crashed into the rear end of 
appellant's truck at a speed of twenty to thirty miles per 
hour. Respondent's automobile moved a distance of two 
feet after the impact and appellant's truck moved a dis-
tance of twelve feet from the point of impact. 
Appellant, other than being shook up, noticed no 
difficulty or injuries at the scene of the accident. An hour 
or so after the accident appellant noticed that his neck got 
stiff and sore. It remained stiff and sore for a period of 
two or three days. The stiffness disappeared for a period 
of approximately two weeks and then it became stiff and 
sore again. At about the time appellant's neck became 
stiff and sore he got a case of ~lsian flu and thought noth-
ing- of the stiffness or soreness in his neck but merely 
thought it was causrd by the flu. T'he stiffness and sore-
neRs of a 1 ll lt'llant 's neck and his headaches continued to 
~ct w<H~t' until they got so bad appellant consulted a doc-
lor on .Ta11uanr :20, 1~)58. 
Dr. Hay Gn'tHle, n11 orthopedist, dignosed appellant's 
eo11<lition ns chronic, moderately seYere, whiplash injury. 
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(R. 86) The doctor advised appellant that he should go 
into a hospital for treatment. Appellant was in the St. 
Mark's Hospital for a period of nine days. He was dis-
charged on February 3, 1958. 
The treatment of appellant consisted primarily of 
applying traction to his neck while he was in bed and the 
wearing of a cervical neck brace when he was up and 
moving around. 
About April 1, 1958, Dr. Greene advised appellant 
that he should try to return to work if possible on a part-
time basis. (R. 108) Appellant tried to return to work but 
was told by his foreman the company did not want appel-
lant working until he could come back on a full-time 
basis. (R. 61) Appellant then, at the suggestion of the 
doctor, started working for a few hours each day on a 
home that appellant was building. Appellant was notre-
leased to return to work until June 2, 1958. (R. 110) 
The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant 
incurred the following out-of-pocket losses. (R. 66 to 70) 
1. Lost wages from 1-20-58 to 6-2-58_ ... $1,691.69 
2. St. Mark's HospitaL___________________________ 150.90 
3. Professional pharmacy prescription 2.04 
4. Cervical brace --------------------------------------
5. Damage to truck __________________________________ _ 
6. Dr. Ray Greene ___________________________________ _ 
17.34 
39.31 
145.00 
TOTAL·-------------------------------$2,046.28 
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At the time of the accident in question appellant was 
employed by Western Steel Company as a mechanic 
machinist. 
The case was tried to a jury on June 10 and 11, 1958. 
The trial court found that respondent was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law and so instructed the jury. The 
question of whether respondent's negligence caused or 
resulted in the injuries complained of by appellant was 
left to the jury. The jury found the issues in favor of 
appellant and against the respondent and awarded appel-
lant a verdict of $1,004.59. $39.31 was for truck damage, 
$315.28 was the exact amount of the medical expenses in-
cuprred by appellant and the balance of the verdict, 
$650.00, was for general damages. ~~ppellant made a 
motion that the jury Yerdict be increased or in the alter-
natiYe that appellant be granted a new trial. (R. 202A) 
This motion \Yas denied by the court. (R. 2020) 
POIXTS ARGrED BY ~\PPELL~\XT 
1. The trial court's Instruction X o. 8 and its refusal 
to give appellant's requested Instruction X o. 1 was preju-
dj<'ial error. 
2. The dnnwg<.~s awarded by the jury were inade-
quate and the trial court should haYe increased the 
a mount of t liP Yerdict or in the alternatiYe granted appel-
lant a lH'W t rinl. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
AND ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSRUCTION N0.1 WAS PREJ-
UDICIAL ERROR. 
Before the trial of the case started, counsel for both 
parties had a conference with Judge Hanson in his cham-
bers. At that conference it was indicated by respondent's 
counsel that he intended to go into the fact that appellant 
had been involved in a similar accident approximately a 
year before the accident in question. Judge Hanson indi-
cated in chambers that respondent's counsel would be per-
mitted to go into the fact of the prior accident providing 
respondent was able to establish that said prior accident 
had something to do with the injuries that appellant was 
then complaining about. (R. 192-197) In view of the 
court's indications in chambers, appellant's counsel 
brought out the fact of the prior accident on direct exami-
nation. (R. 66) Appellant testified that the only injuries 
he received in the prior accident was some pelvic injuries 
and internal injuries. He testified he did not receive any 
injury at all to his neck or back. (R. 66-68) Dr. Ray 
Greene testified that if there had been any injury to appel-
lant's neck caused in the November, 1956, accident, that 
he would expect to have seen some evidence of that fact 
in the X-rays. Dr. Greene testified he saw no changes in 
the X-rays that indicated any injury to appellant's neck 
in the prior accident. (R. 126, 127) 
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At no place in Dr. Reed Clegg's testimony, the expert 
called by respondent, was anything at all said that would 
in any way indicate that appellant's whiplash injury 
complained of in this case resulted from or had anything 
to do with the prior accident of November, 1956. (R. 126-
142) Although respondent claimed that there was some 
relationship between the whiplash injury suffered 
by appellant that is the subject of this law suit and the 
prior accident of November, 1956, all of the affirmative 
evidence shows the prior accident had nothing at all to 
do with the present injuries. An examination of the en-
tire record fails to show any evidence of any kind that 
tends in any way to indicate that the whiplash injury 
suffered by the appellant after the accident in question 
had anything to do with or was in any way caused by or 
contributed to by the prior accident of November, 1956. 
Since respondent claimed there was some connection 
between the prior accident and appellant's present in-
juries and since appellant himself brought out as a part 
of his direct case the fact of the prior accident, there was 
no error on the part of the trial court in admitting evi-
<1Pnce of the fact of the prior accident. Ho-we\er, -when at 
1 he eoncl us ion of respondent's case. there -was no evidence 
ut all in the n'cord. that tended to shLnY any connection 
bPt ween the present injuries of appellant and the prior 
tt<'eidPnt, it was the duty of the trial court to instruct the 
jury that the prior aeeident had nothing to do with 
npJH_,llnnt's prPsent injuries and it was the duty of the 
t.rinl court to inst rnct the jury to disregard any and all 
evidenee c·om·prning the prior aeeident in determining the 
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cause of appellant's injuries and in assessing appellant's 
damages. Appellant in his requested Instruction No. 1 
requested the court to so instruct the jury relative to the 
prior accident. The court refused to give said requested 
instruction and failed to give it in substance or at all. 
Instruction No. 8 as given by the court was as 
follows : (R. 20) 
' 'You are further instructed that if you find 
that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, then in 
awarding him damages you may consider only his 
loss, if any, which a preponderance of the evidence 
shows resulted from the accident on October 25, 
1957. He is not entitled to damages for a condition 
or loss from other accidents or causes unrelated to 
the collision with the defendant's automobile." 
A reading of Instruction No. 8 immediately shows 
that the jury was permitted to consider the fact of the 
prior accident and to speculate on what effect it may 
have had on appellant's present injuries. 
While the instruction itself may not be an incorrect 
statement of the law, when it is read in light of the evi-
dence that appears in the record concerning the prior 
accident, and when it is read in light of the fact that 
respondent failed completely to show any connection at 
all between the prior accident and appellant's present 
injuries, the prejudicial effect of the instruction can 
immediately be seen. This is particularly true in view of 
the fact that the trial court did not at any place instruct 
the jury that there was no evidence showing any connec-
tion at all between the prior accident and appellant's 
present injuries. 
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The last sentence of the instruction which reads, 
''He is not entitled to da;mages for a condition or loss 
from other accidents or causes unrelated to the collision 
with the defendant's automobile," permits the jury to 
speculate or to infer that some part of the injury com-
plained of by appellant was or could have been caused by 
the prior accident. 
We submit that it was prejudicial error for the court 
to give its Instruction No.8 and its refusal to give appel-
lant's requested Instruction X o. 1 -which reads as follows: 
''The defendant in this case is claiming that 
plaintiff's injuries, if any, were caused by the prior 
accident of November of 1956. In this connection 
you are instructed that the mere fact that plaintiff 
was involved in said prior accident, standing alone, 
is not sufficient evidence to sho-w that plaintiff's 
injuries, if any, complained of in this action were 
caused or contributed to by said prior accident. 
you are instructed that there is no endence 
that plaintiff's injuries. if any, were caused or con-
tributed to by said prior accident and you are fur-
ther instructed that you are to ignore the prior 
accident in determining the cause of plaintiff's 
injurit:•s, if an:¥, and in assessing plaintiff's dam-
ages, if an:¥.'' 
It is g"PllPrall~· held that eYidenre of a driYer's pre-
vious aecide11ts is inndmissible in a ri,¥il action arising 
out of a motor YehirlL' accident, since such eYidence is 
imnw h'rial in t 1w ddl'l'mination of the driYers ·negligence 
on the ocen~ion in qw'stion. 5A . :\m. Jur., Sec. 946 and 
948, p. 836, :20 .A.L.R. (:2) 1:210. 
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When respondent failed to show that the November, 
1956
1 
accident had anything to do with appellant's pres-
ent injuries the same principle would apply, namely, that 
evidence of the prior accident was immaterial and the 
court should have instructed the jury to disregard such 
evidence. Its refusal to so instruct was prejudicial error. 
The, trial court agreed that there was no evidence 
that tended to show any connection between the prior 
accident and the present injuries of appellant, (R. 181) 
but still refused to so instruct the jury. 
POINT 2 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY 
WERE INADEQUATE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE INCREASED THE 
AMOUNT OF THE VERDICT OR IN THE AL-
TERNATIVE GRANED APPELLANT A NEW 
TRIAL. 
The trial court found that respondent was negligent 
as a matter of law. The jury, by making an award to the 
appellant, found that respondent's negligence resulted in 
injury to the appellant. The uncontradicted evidence 
shows that appellant sustained the following losses: 
(R. 66-70) 
Hospital Bill ------------------------------------$ 150.90 
Prescription ------------------------------------ 2.04 
Cervical Brace -------------------------------- 17.34 
Truck Damage -------------------------------- 39.31 
Doctor Bill ---------··------------------------------ 145.00 
Loss of Wages __________________________________ 1,691.69 
TOTAL ________________________ $2,046.28 
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The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant 
suffered with a sore, stiff neck and suffered headaches 
from the time of the accident down to the time of trial 
and that appellant was still suffering from headaches at 
the time of the trial and that he would continue to suffer 
with them in the future. (R. 110) Appellant was in the 
hospital for nine days. At the time of the trial he was still 
using the traction at night and was still required to wear 
the cervical brace at times. 
We think the case at bar falls squarely within the rule 
announced in Badon v. Suhrm(Jfi'l!Yb, 327 P. 2d 826, ____ Utah 
____ , where the court said, 
''Nevertheless when the verdict is outside the 
limits of any reasonable appraisal of the damages 
as shown by the evidence, it should not be per-
mitted to stand, and if the trial court fails to rec-
tify it, we are obliged to make the correction on 
appeal.'' 
The uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant 
sustained out-of-pocket losses amounting to the sum of 
$2,046.28. The jury in awarding appellant the sum of 
$1,004.59 has disregarded the uncontradicted evidence in 
the case and its verdict is completely outside the limits 
of any reasonable appraisal of the damages as shown by 
the evidence. Appellant urges the Supreme Court to 
increase the amount of the judgment in this case or in 
the alternative to grant appellant a ne'v trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI 
Attorneys for Appellant 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
